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In this article, the authors introduce a new feature to model the collective bargaining process: a two-level
game setting with direct learner-expert interaction. In the simulation ZUG UM ZUG 2015, participants
form union and management negotiation teams to negotiate with each other (first level) and with a man-
agement or union “tariff commission,” which has to approve proposed contracts (second level). To
increase the degree of realism and the teaching effectiveness of the simulation, real-world negotiation
experts negotiate in tariff commissions directly with participants. The authors also introduce a negotia-
tion process to facilitate an efficient knowledge transfer from experts to learners.
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In most simulations, practitioners in the areas simulated are absent. Although
simulation developers often interview professionals to create scenarios and computer-
based evaluation systems, these experts are not included in the simulation settings.
Learners interact with each other and/or with a computer, but a direct transfer of
knowledge between practitioners in the field and the learners does not take place.
With the simulation ZUG UM ZUG 2015 (Schilling, 2005), we followed a different
path. Instead of having participants interact with a computer, we created a setting in
which student teams negotiated both with each other and with professionals. We
believe that this set-up leads to a more efficient transfer of knowledge. ZUG UM
ZUG 2015 can therefore be classified as a behavioral collective bargaining simula-
tion (Summers, 2004) with direct learner-expert interaction.
There is a long tradition of modeling collective bargaining negotiations. French
(1961) was one of the first to create a labor-management negotiation environment in
the laboratory. Following Walton and McKersie’s (1965) seminal work on distributive
and integrative approaches to collective bargaining, a series of other studies modeling
labor-management interactions was published. These exercises can be divided roughly
into three types: simulations and case studies (e.g., Bohret & Wordelmann, 1974;
Gahan & Macdonald, 2001; Lavin, 1988; Sackman, 1974; Sandver & Blaine, 1979;
Stevens & Bohlander, 1982), studies about teaching effectiveness and/or attitudinal
change in collective bargaining settings (e.g., Axe, 1988; Brennenstuhl & Blalack,
1978; Roderick, Wilterding, & Eldredge, 1979; Sandver, 1983; Tracy & Peterson,
1975), and participant-computer negotiations (e.g., Heintz & Schreier, 1981; Murphy,
Hines, & Debenham, 1982; Stanton & Greer, 1977). Simulation authors are often
forced to make trade-offs between fidelity—the level of realism presented to the
learner—and training effectiveness. Simulations model many of the important features
of collective bargaining and simplify others. As an example of one common simplifi-
cation, the “approval level” is eliminated in the laboratory negotiation. However, in
many real-world collective bargaining situations, there are at least two levels to the
negotiation. Negotiators must deal both with their direct opposites and with a body that
has the power to approve or reject agreements.
Collective bargaining simulation developers often ignore these principal-agent
relationships (e.g., Bohret & Wordelmann, 1974; Heintz & Schreier, 1981). Typically,
a single union representative and a single management representative (or two nego-
tiation teams) discuss a set of predefined issues. Although it is often the case that
these simplifications of the real-world negotiation process are necessary, as high
complexity can overwhelm novices (for a summary of relevant studies, see Feinstein
& Cannon, 2002), important elements of the labor relations process are missed. In
the ZUG UM ZUG 2015 simulation described here, we add this two-level game fea-
ture that is otherwise often omitted. The participants in ZUG UM ZUG 2015 discuss
possible contracts with real-world negotiation experts during the simulation. This
direct learner-expert interaction at two levels of the negotiation process aims at
enhancing both the fidelity and the training effectiveness of the simulation.
In the following sections, we introduce the scenario of ZUG UM ZUG 2015 and
describe the integrative nature of the simulation, the two-level game feature, the
negotiation process, and the learning objectives of ZUG UM ZUG 2015.
Scenario
The simulation is set in Germany in the year 2015. We use this future scenario to
help the participating experts find common ground by getting away from their present-
focused, sector-specific experience. In addition to a description of the current (2015)
situation, the participants receive a projection of the German railway sector’s likely
developments in 2016, including information about probable future growth in GNP,
inflation, and predicted productivity increases in the railway industry. In addition,
participants obtain details of the collective bargaining agreements concluded earlier
in the year 2015 in related industries.
Negotiation issues
To make the issues and options as realistic as possible, the authors carried out exten-
sive interviews with German railway experts from both management and labor. Based
on those interviews, six negotiation issues were included in the simulation. Each issue
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includes several discrete options. For each option, the management team obtains infor-
mation about the increase in labor costs (in percentages), whereas the union team
obtains information about the relevant benefits of each option, measured in points.
Salary and contract length. Salary and contract length are almost always linked
as a single, hybrid issue in collective bargaining in Germany. A standard contract
length is 12 months. Management usually prefers to extend the contract beyond 12
months as a way to put off future demands for higher wages. For example, a 5% rise
in salary may be unacceptable to management in a 12-month contract but acceptable
in a 24-month contract. To capture this dynamic, the actual annual cost of a per-




where c = cost, CL = contract length, and x = percentage increase in salary.
Furthermore, we assume that above a certain threshold (in the simulation, this is set
at greater than 6%), the agreement is assumed to be infeasible. Indicative values are
provided in Table 1.
Working time. Management and union parties have to negotiate changes in
weekly working time. An alteration of the status quo is possible in both directions.
Parties can agree on seven options, ranging from 37 to 40 hours per week. Changes
in working time do not affect changes in salary.
Job security. The 2015 employees are particularly interested in job security. The
parties can agree to institute a job security program in which management guarantees
TABLE 1: Actual Annual Labor Cost Increases in Percentages for Different Salary Increases and
Contract Lengths
Contract Length (in months)
Linear Increase in Salary 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
4.00% 4.00% 3.43% 3.00% 2.67% 2.40% 2.18% 2.00%
4.20% 4.20% 3.60% 3.15% 2.80% 2.52% 2.29% 2.10%
4.40% 4.40% 3.77% 3.30% 2.93% 2.64% 2.40% 2.20%
4.60% 4.60% 3.94% 3.45% 3.07% 2.76% 2.51% 2.30%
4.80% 4.80% 4.11% 3.60% 3.20% 2.88% 2.62% 2.40%
5.00% 5.00% 4.29% 3.75% 3.33% 3.00% 2.73% 2.50%
5.20% 5.20% 4.46% 3.90% 3.47% 3.12% 2.84% 2.60%
5.40% 5.40% 4.63% 4.05% 3.60% 3.24% 2.95% 2.70%
5.60% 5.60% 4.80% 4.20% 3.73% 3.36% 3.05% 2.80%
5.80% 5.80% 4.97% 4.35% 3.87% 3.48% 3.16% 2.90%
6.00% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
not to fire any staff (for nondisciplinary issues) for a discrete period of time. The par-
ties can agree on no guarantee, a “political” statement, or a 1-, 2-, or 3-year guarantee.
Working break acknowledgment. Due to the nature of the railway industry, oper-
ational breaks in working days are common. Timetabling means that staff will often
have breaks in their work. For example, a train driver may have to wait a short time
for an incoming train. These breaks are particularly common during off-peak times
and/or in areas with relatively low levels of service. Negotiation teams have to agree
on how this break time will be integrated into total paid working time. Six options
are available: operational breaks are not paid at all (best for employer side), 20% of
the break time is paid, 40% of the break time is paid, 60% or 80% of the break time
is paid, or operational breaks are fully paid (best for union side).
Vacation. The negotiation teams can agree on an increase or decrease in holidays.
Seven discrete options are available, ranging from 23 to 29 days of annual vacation.
Ticket discounts for employees. Railway companies may offer employees and
their relatives a variety of price reductions on network travel. Negotiation teams
must decide on the number of free tickets per year. They can settle on five discrete
options: 5 free national tickets per year per employee, 10 free national tickets per
year per employee, 15 free national tickets per year per employee, unlimited travel
on the national network for employees, or unlimited travel on the national network
plus 10 free national tickets for relatives of employees.
Reaching agreement
To reach a final settlement, the parties must agree on one option for each of the
six issues. The union calculates the overall benefits as the sum of the benefit points
of each option agreed. The overall costs for management are determined by sum-
ming up the costs of each option agreed. We assume that the parties’ choice of one
option on one issue does not affect the valuation of options on other issues (prefer-
ence independence).
Thresholds. To simulate the pressure of the rank and file of the union and the pres-
sure of the companies’boards, both teams have to reach certain thresholds—reservation
points—before they can agree to a deal (Raiffa, 1982; Raiffa, Richardson, & Metcalfe,
2002; Thompson, 2005). At their reservation point, the parties are indifferent between
settling the agreement and breaking off the negotiation. If a settlement is reached
that results in more costs or less benefits than their reservation points, the team
members are assumed to lose their jobs. If, for example, the management side agrees
to a contract that results in a 7% increase in overall labor costs, and their reservation
point is fixed at 6%, the management side would have failed to negotiate a feasible
contract.
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Strikes. In addition to normal negotiation tactics, the union teams can threaten
and/or call strikes. In some real-world transport companies, it is easy for a union to
mobilize its rank and file to close down a central station for at least 1 hour. However,
there is always a certain risk of escalation. Specifically, members may strike for
longer than the called-for time. After the 1st hour, there is a 40% chance that the
strike will last another hour. If it lasts 2 hours, there is a 40% chance that it will last
3, and so on. If the union calls a strike, they only know for sure that their members
will strike for at least 1 hour. Each hour of strike is costly for management and the
union, as the company is losing customers and the union has to pay their members.
Finally, and independent from the above-described short-term strikes, longer
strikes are possible but only when one party announces the negotiation to be over
without a settlement. This results in a major strike and ends the simulation.
An integrative negotiation setting
In distributive negotiations, the size of the surplus created by the overlap in reser-
vation prices is fixed. Thus, one person’s gain is necessarily another’s loss. For
example, a negotiation about the price of one piece of jewelry at an oriental bazaar is
a distributive negotiation. Increasing the price by x necessarily results in a gain of x
for the seller and a loss of x for the buyer. Collective bargaining negotiations, how-
ever, are rarely distributive in nature. Rather, they involve negotiations over multiple
issues where negotiators’ preferences across and within issues differ. These differ-
ences allow for trade-offs across issues that can increase the size of the negotiation
surplus and, hence, the size of the payoffs to all parties. In the example of labor rela-
tions, assume the union is more concerned with guaranteed employment for a certain
period than with a high rise in wages, whereas management is more concerned with
a low pay rise, keeping labor costs at an acceptable level. In this case, a concession
by the union away from its original demand of a high pay rise to a more moderate
amount could be matched by guaranteed employment for a longer period by man-
agement, thus increasing the value of the agreement for both parties. Efficiency gains
potentially occur in collective bargaining wherever such trade-offs across issues
are possible. For descriptions of distributive versus integrative models, see Bazerman
(2002), Bazerman and Neale (1992), Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton (2001), Raiffa
(1982), Raiffa et al. (2002), Thompson (2005), and Walton and McKersie (1965).
With the six issues outlined above, ZUG UM ZUG 2015 is an integrative negoti-
ation. Depending on the choices of options on each issue, the joint value of the final
contract to both parties varies. Some contracts result in lower costs to the manage-
ment side and more benefits to the unions than other agreements. The general idea
is graphically displayed in Figure 1.
As illustrated in Figure 1, contract A results in cA percentage increase in costs for
the management and in bA benefit points for the unions. By agreeing to some mutu-
ally beneficial trades, as outlined above, the negotiators can move the contract posi-
tion toward the efficiency border in the area northwest described by C, A, and B.
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However, this does not mean that the negotiation is without conflict. Point B repre-
sents a contract where only the union profits from these trades from the initial point
A. Contract B is—compared with contract A—equally costly for the management
side (cA = cB) but increases the benefit to the unions substantially (bB > bA). Point C
represents the other extreme: The benefit to the unions is the same as for contract A
(bA = bC). It is, however, substantially less costly for the management side (cC < cA).
Participants of ZUG UM ZUG 2015 are therefore confronted with a mixed-
motive situation (Thompson, 2005). On one hand, they have an interest in creating
additional value in the settlement by agreeing on mutually beneficial trade-offs. On
the other hand, each side wants to claim most of this value. Each party should, role-
depending, aim either to maximize benefits or to minimize the increase in labor-
related costs. To find efficiency increasing trade-offs, confidential information has to
be shared. If, however, one party reveals too much information, the other side can
usually exploit this and claim more of the created surplus (Thompson, 1991).
A two-level game
The structure of a negotiation—independent of its distributive or integrative
nature—significantly changes when negotiators must deal both with their direct
opposites and with a person or body that has the power to approve or reject agree-
ments (see Putnam, 1988). Participants in ZUG UM ZUG 2015 simulate a manage-
ment or a union negotiation team of three fictional railway companies in Germany
in the year 2015. These six teams negotiate with each other to attempt to reach an
agreement on company-specific contracts (first level). However, these teams cannot











FIGURE 1: Contract Space for ZUG UM ZUG 2015
must consult regularly during the negotiations with a management or a union “tariff
commission” (second level). These commissions are made up of “real” management
and union experts. To get contract proposals approved, the negotiation teams must
have the consent of their respective commissions. This two-level structure is a com-
mon feature in collective bargaining negotiations in Germany.
Expert participation
In the first and second run of ZUG UM ZUG 2015, negotiation experts from six
German unions (GDBA, GDL, IG BCE, IG Metall, transnet, ver.di) as well as from
four German blue-chip companies (Die Bahn, Deutsche Bank, HOCHTIEF, Deutsche
Lufthansa) and three employers’ associations (AgV Banken, Arbeitgeberverband der
Mobilitäts- und Verkehrsdiensleister, Gesamtmetall) simulated the tariff commissions.
Within this two-level game setting, the experts interact directly with students, generat-
ing a rich, applied learning environment. In reality, three companies require three man-
agement and three union tariff commissions. Because it is difficult to recruit experts
for six commissions, we formed one management and one union tariff commission.
The negotiation teams of the three companies therefore negotiated with each other and
consulted regularly with the single management or the union tariff commission. This
two-level game setting of ZUG UM ZUG 2015 is displayed in Figure 2.
Simulation development and runs
Between 2003 and 2005, we ran 10 alpha tests with codevelopers to calibrate the
point-scores of the to-be-negotiated issues and 2 beta tests with student groups to test
the two-level game structure. In April 2004 and November 2005, we organized the
first two simulation runs with scholarship holders from the Foundation of the German
Business and the union-led Hans-Böckler Foundation as members of the first-level
negotiation teams. According to their feedback, the processes, as outlined below,
proved to be highly valuable in teaching negotiation tactics firsthand. Participating
experts confirmed the simulation’s external validity on the major issues of collective
bargaining in the railway industry. In their eyes, particularly the pressure emanating
from a tight schedule, ambitious demands by the tariff commissions, and the high
emotional involvement of real-world collective bargaining were reproduced well by
the ZUG UM ZUG 2015 simulation. Due to the number of negotiation rounds, strat-
egy evolution over time was a major lesson that the experts were able to pass on to
the students. As one management representative put it, “You could feel the partici-
pants’ rising learning curves across the different phases of the simulation.”
Simulation process
To facilitate this two-level game setting in a 1-day simulation, we developed a
system that enabled all participants to negotiate with a minimum of pauses. After a





























half-hour introduction to the processes and issues of ZUG UM ZUG 2015, each nego-
tiation team and the tariff commission consulted in private to develop a negotiation
strategy. This strategy meeting was followed by four 1-hour-long negotiation rounds.
In each of these rounds, the teams consulted for 20 minutes with the tariff commis-
sion and negotiated for 40 minutes with their company’s other negotiation team. Each
company had, in each round, a fixed time slot in which they consulted with their
respective tariff commission. The teams negotiating the contract for Company 1 con-
sulted with their commissions in the first 20 minutes of the round and negotiated with
each other in the last 40 minutes. The negotiating parties of Company 2 negotiated for
the first 20 minutes of the round with each other, consulted subsequently for 20 min-
utes with their tariff commissions, and negotiated on the first level in the last 20 min-
utes of the round. The representatives of Company 3 negotiated for the first 40 minutes
with each other and consulted in the last 20 minutes with the tariff commissions. With
this system, the experts on the second level were able to transfer knowledge to the
students during the whole round. In the last negotiation round, one representative of
the tariff commission accompanied the negotiation teams to the first-level negotia-
tions to enable the teams to sign a contract directly.
After the parties signed the final contracts, the tariff commissions gave feedback
to the negotiation teams about their bargaining tactics. In addition, the results were
analyzed with a computer-based model as shown generally in Figure 1. The analy-
ses describe the efficiency of the agreed-on compromises and potential ways to
improve the value of the agreement to both sides. This process also allowed the
negotiation teams’ results to be compared with each other, thus identifying teams
who yielded a higher surplus than others. The complete negotiation process, leading
to these results, is displayed in Figure 3.
Learning objectives
ZUG UM ZUG 2015 has been primarily developed for a sequence of joint semi-
nars for the Foundation of the German Business and the union-led Hans-Böckler
Foundation in Germany. It was designed to serve a number of goals.
Build trust between future management and union leaders
ZUG UM ZUG 2015 has location-specific objectives as it is used to build inter-
personal trust between young management and union representatives in Germany.
With ZUG UM ZUG 2015, we aim to foster a more cooperative atmosphere in future
collective bargaining situations in Germany. We ask students from the union’s foun-
dation (Hans-Böckler) and the management-oriented Foundation of the German
Business to form joint negotiation teams. Thus, potential real-life “opponents” will
be team “partners” in a laboratory situation and share the experience of working
toward a common goal. According to participants’ feedback from the first two pilot
studies, mixed-team structures proved to be a major source of mutual trust building.






























Increase negotiators’ abilities to construct
efficient and advantageous contracts
ZUG UM ZUG 2015 provides negotiation teams with a complex setting to apply
efficiency-increasing bargaining tactics. Increased efficiency in this context refers to
negotiated changes that lead to an increase in value for at least one of the teams,
without a decrease in value to the other team. In addition to jointly seeking increases
in agreement efficiency, participants need to either minimize increases in labor costs
(management) or maximize benefits to the employees (unions). As increases in ben-
efits usually lead to some increases in costs, participants must deal with conflicting
objectives: They have to increase the size of the to-be-negotiated pie, while securing
the biggest slice of it for themselves. In other words, participants experience the
mixed-motive environment of integrative negotiation (Thompson, 2005).
Create insights into some of the unique issues of collective bargaining
Participants of ZUG UM ZUG 2015 obtain firsthand insights into negotiation tac-
tics and communication styles of management and labor by interacting directly with
real-world collective bargaining experts. For union teams, this means gaining expe-
rience in the use (and abuse) of issuing strike threats. The democratic, discussion-
oriented style of many unions is simulated as well. Management teams obtain
knowledge on when and how to make offers to the unions and get a better insight
into the more hierarchical decision structures typical of management.
Conclusion
ZUG UM ZUG 2015 is a collective bargaining simulation with a two-level game
feature with direct learner-expert interaction. We added these features to a more tra-
ditional integrative negotiation simulation to increase educational validity. To make
a simulation like this feasible, the negotiation situation has to be radically simplified.
The number of issues is limited, options in each issue are clearly defined, and pref-
erences are quantified. As the setting was complicated to develop, we have
focused—until now—more on verification than on validation (as discussed in
Feinstein & Cannon, 2002).
The simulation continues to undergo improvements and refinements. First, the
quantitative preferences of the union and management sides will be continually
reassessed based on comments from negotiation experts in the German railway
industry. Second, several industry-specific alterations of the ZUG UM ZUG tem-
plate are planned to develop training opportunities for young union and management
negotiators. Third, the trust-building objectives will be strengthened not only by
mixing negotiation teams with scholarship holders of a management and a union-led
foundation but also by exchanging experts in the tariff commission.
We view the two-level game structure with direct learner-expert interactions as one
way to efficiently facilitate knowledge transfers from experts to learners. This system
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might be useful in other simulation contexts as well. Total enterprise simulations, for
example, could possibly be organized with real-world experts on a second level. The
experts could consult with different groups of students on how to develop company
strategies. Although we think that such an approach is promising, the applicability of
this idea to domains other than negotiation simulations is still to be proven.
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